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The  paper  proposes  a  theoretical  analysis  illustrating  some  key  policy  trade-offs 
involved in the implementation of a rules-based fiscal framework reminiscent of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The analysis offers some insights on the current 
debate  about  the  SGP.  Specifically,  greater  "procedural"  flexibility  in  the 
implementation  of  existing  rules  may  improve  welfare,  thus  increasing the  Pact’s 
political acceptability. Here, procedural flexibility designates the enforcer’s room to 
apply  well-informed  judgment  on  the  basis  of  underlying  policies  and  to  set  a 
consolidation  path  that  does  not  discourage  high-quality  policy  measures.  Yet 
budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy, possibly 
destroying  the  case  for  flexibility.  Also,  improved  budget  monitoring  and  greater 
transparency  increase  the  benefits  from  greater  procedural  flexibility.  Overall,  we 
establish that a fiscal pact based on a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural 
flexibility can simultaneously contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending 
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Practically since its inception, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been under
ﬁerce criticism. In November 2003, the problems with the SGP culminated in the failure
of its enforcement on France and Germany, two repeated violators of the deﬁcit criterion.
Though sharing the view that rules are necessary to constrain ﬁscal proﬂigacy, many have
blamed the SGP’s basic design, while others believe its weakness is in its implementation,
indicating that its constraining elements (in particular the sanctions) cannot be enforced.
Experts have put forward a large number of proposals to reform the SGP. These vary
from making the maximum allowable deﬁcit dependent on the debt level to setting up
independent ﬁscal boards that each year impose a new deﬁcit limit on individual countries.
Many of these proposals would require a rewriting of the SGP’s Regulations or even of
the Treaty on the European Union. These options have been explicitly rejected by the
Ministers of Economics and Finance, who have also endorsed the European Commission’s
call to enhance the economic rationale underlying the implementation of the SGP.
Against this background, the current paper explores some key policy trade-oﬀsi nt h e
implementation of a uniform ﬁscal framework in a monetary union with decentralized ﬁscal
policies. The analysis highlights two key requirements for a successful ﬁscal framework
in EMU, namely the need for simple and transparent rules and the need to improve the
quality of the economic principles underlying their implementation.
We cast our analysis in the context of a two-period model of ﬁscal policy, with a
partisan government selecting the deﬁcit along with the provision of public goods and
“high-quality” outlays. The latter are deﬁn e da sm e a s u r e st h a tb o o s te c o n o m i ca c t i v i t y
in the longer run. This could be public investment or - the interpretation we prefer -
short-term budgetary outlays associated with structural reforms, such as reforms of the
labor market. Electoral uncertainty induces the government to run excessive deﬁcits,
while implementing too little reform, given that reform only pays oﬀ in the longer run.
The deﬁcit bias provides a rationale for a discipline-enhancing ﬁscal framework (a “ﬁscal
pact”). We assume that the pact is enforced by an independent agency, which has the
ﬂexibility to shape the enforcement of the basic rules to the particular circumstances of
a case (“procedural ﬂexibility”), exerting expert judgment independently from policy-
makers. Our setup distinguishes such procedural ﬂexibility explicitly from the strictness
of enforcement. We focus on the way the ﬁscal framework aﬀects the policy-makers’
incentives. While enforcement through some sanction mechanism is intended to curb the
deﬁcit bias, procedural ﬂexibility should preserve the government’s incentive to implement
structural reforms.
In the basic setup, which assumes a transparent budget, a ﬂexible implementation of
the ﬁscal pact generally increases its positive welfare eﬀects. However, greater procedural
ﬂexibility, while improving the quality of ﬁscal policy, comes at the cost of weakening the
disciplining role of ﬁscal pacts. Therefore, countries faced with a large deﬁcit bias need
stricter enforcement and less ﬂexibility while, all else being equal, those with greater needs
of reforms, should be treated with more ﬂexibility. In the euro area, the continued reluc-
tance to carry out structural reforms, and the persistent diﬃculty to exert ﬁscal restraint
suggest that amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact should aim at strengthen-
ing the enforcement of ﬁscal discipline while paying greater attention to the underlying
causes of excessive deﬁcits. However, if the tightness of enforcement is given and the only
possible amendments concern the pact’s procedural ﬂexibility, then increasing the latter
boosts welfare only if the marginal income gains expected from high-quality spending are
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enforcer can always increase the desirability of the existing rules by setting a minimum
threshold for high-quality outlays below which it will never apply any procedural ﬂexi-
bility. Such an arrangement extracts more reform at relatively low cost in terms of ﬁscal
discipline.
The next step in our analysis is to relax the assumption of transparent budgets and
examine the implications of budgetary opaqueness for the feasibility and desirability of
procedural ﬂexibility. To this end, we expand the model to allow for a third expenditure
item, namely unproductive spending. Such spending beneﬁts policy-makers only, but not
society at large. For example, the government may extend favors to its own constituency
or create jobs with minimal productivity. We assume that the pact’s enforcer cannot
distinguish such programs from reform-related expenditure, implying that it is unaware
of the underlying ”quality” of the deﬁcit. In this case, unconditional ﬂexibility makes
the ﬁscal pact counter-productive. However, procedural ﬂexibility can raise welfare under
budgetary opaqueness if the enforcer shows only a limited tolerance for the lack of trans-
parency by imposing a ceiling on the overspending up to which it stands ready to waive
sanctions. In that case, we establish that a ﬁscal pact based on a straightforward deﬁcit
rule with procedural ﬂexibility restricted to relatively small ﬁscal slippages can simulta-
neously contain excessive deﬁcits, lower unproductive spending and increase high-quality
outlays.
To put our analysis further into perspective, some observations are warranted. First,
while our analysis suggests that procedural ﬂexibility based on an independent and non-
politicized judgment might well strengthen the SGP, ﬂexibility should not be confused
with a loosening of enforcement. On the contrary, enforcement should be strengthened
to ensure that governments actually expect to pay some price for unwarranted proﬂigacy.
In such a scenario, the application of the corrective dimension of the pact would prob-
ably be limited to truly unacceptable ﬁscal behaviors so that violators ﬁnd themselves
isolated and unable to form coalitions inside the Council to block enforcement. Second,
as budgetary opaqueness provides opportunities to abuse procedural ﬂexibility, the latter
should be exerted with caution, in practice excluding large ﬁscal slippages. Improving
transparency and budgetary surveillance is thus an important step to secure the beneﬁts
from an increase in procedural ﬂexibility. In fact, a practical implication of the model is
that, when pondering the option of granting a sanction waiver, the enforcer should only
consider those structural reforms with the most easily traceable budgetary impact. Third,
to preserve focus and clear intuitions, our discussion of the implementation of ﬁscal rules
neglects some potentially serious operational obstacles associated with a ﬂexible imple-
mentation of a ﬁscal pact. Limited information on the precise extent of a reform package,
or on its future pay-oﬀsm a k e si td i ﬃcult to assess the desirable degree of ﬂexibility the
enforcer should have in authorizing deviations from the letter of the rule. Further, lim-
ited budgetary transparency prevents an even-handed application of the rules. Finally,
the model also abstracts from the politics of implementation, and simply emphasizes the
well-known virtue of a non-politicized implementation of rules supposed to correct the
eﬀects of political bias. Exploring implementation mechanisms that are robust to these
important constraints will be an important issue for further research.
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Because they regulate the actions of sovereign States, international treaties and pacts often
suﬀer from a fundamental implementation problem owing in large part to the absence of
an eﬀective, legitimate and independent enforcer. In theory, sheer good faith (enshrined
in the ”pacta sunt servanda”1 principle) is the cornerstone of treaty-based international
law. In practice, even though the supranational status of Community law and institutions
(including a judiciary) partly alleviates the enforcement problem, sovereign States abide
by treaties as long as they perceive it in their interest to do so.
With this in mind, we analyze some key policy trade-oﬀsi n v o l v e di nt h ei m p l e m e n t a -
tion of a uniform ﬁscal framework in a monetary union with decentralized ﬁscal policies.
The analysis sheds light on ways to prevent the "procedural impasse" that followed the
ECOFIN’s failure in November 2003 to apply the Pact for two serial oﬀenders (France
and Germany) faced with the prospect of enhanced budgetary surveillance, detailed rec-
ommendations for policy changes, and even pecuniary sanctions.
The failure to enforce the Pact’s most stringent provisions points to two possible inter-
pretations that have shaped the policy debate so far.2 The ﬁrst interpretation emphasizes
a fundamental lack of enforceability rooted mainly in the fact that the ”responsibility for
making the Member States observe budgetary discipline lies essentially with the Council”
(European Court of Justice, 2004), that is with (some weighted average of) the Member
States themselves. The second interpretation stresses procedural issues, suggesting that
the current procedure pays excessive attention to the letter of the regulation (that is an
arbitrary numerical ceiling on the nominal deﬁcit) and neglects its spirit, which is to avoid
that unwarranted ﬁscal expansions reduce the beneﬁts of a union-wide commitment to ﬁ-
nancial stability. Hence, the failure to recognize that some ﬁscal expansions are actually
warranted3 made the Pact’s implementation procedure excessively rigid, leading a num-
ber of member states to worry that the ﬁscal framework might too easily conﬂict with
their interest. This might explain why the Commission’s recommendation to proceed with
the most stringent provisions of the Pact against France and Germany did not win the
required majority in the Council, eﬀectively freezing the procedure for these countries.4
Our paper proposes a simple theoretical analysis articulating two key requirements
for a successful ﬁscal framework in EMU, namely the need to keep the rules simple and
transparent and the need to improve the quality of the economic principles underlying
their implementation. As most of the related literature, the model focuses on the way
1”Treaties must be respected.”
2The European Commission (2004) discusses in great detail the operational aspects of the Stability
and Growth Pact brought to the fore by the November 2003 events, including a number of proposals to
reform the implementation of the Pact.
3To many observers, ﬁscal behavior in France and Germany hardly qualiﬁed as a deliberate burst of
laxity in view of the protracted slowdown aﬀecting these economies.
4The November 2003 Council’s conclusions explicitly putting the excessive deﬁcit procedure in
abeyance were annulled by the European Court of Justice in a ruling of July 13, 2004. At the time
of writing (November 2004), the procedure remains on hold.
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concrete distinction between the straightforward implementation of very complicated rules
and a ﬂexible enforcement of simple rules. In practice, the former requires a large set of
elaborate contingency plans attached to the core rules whereas the latter supposes that
an independent agency has the ﬂexibility to shape the enforcement of the basic rules
to the particular circumstances of a case, exerting expert judgment independently from
policymakers. While we recognize that our results could be interpreted in the ﬁrst model
of implementation (complicated contingency plans),5 we adopt the language associated
with the second model (expert judgement embedded in the enforcement procedure).
The presumption that a more ﬂexible implementation procedure of simple deﬁcit rules
is the only practical way to strengthen the economic principles underlying the ﬁscal frame-
work leads us to explicitly distinguish the strictness of enforcement from what we term
procedural ﬂexibility, that is the enforcer’s room for manoeuvre to account for case-speciﬁc
circumstances. We also examine how the lack of budgetary transparency undermines the
ﬂexible implementation of simple rules as misreporting and creative accounting are facili-
tated.
The basic theoretical benchmark is a two-period model of ﬁscal policy in which a
partisan government chooses the deﬁcit along with two expenditure items: the provision of
public goods, and ”high-quality” outlays (deﬁned as measures boosting economic activity
in period two). The latter could be interpreted as productive public investment or, as
in Beetsma and Debrun (2004), short-term (period-one) budgetary costs proportional to
the ambition of a structural reforms agenda, which is also the interpretation retained in
the present analysis.6 In equilibrium, the government has a tendency to run excessive
deﬁcits–providing a rationale for a stability pact–while spending too little on high-
quality items. These ineﬃciencies stem from exogenous electoral uncertainty driving the
policymaker’s subjective discount rate above Society’s level. We introduce a discipline-
enhancing ﬁscal framework (that we call ”ﬁscal pact”), assuming that a non-politicized
supranational authority (SNA) is entrusted with the power to impose “sanctions” in case
the actual deﬁcit exceeds a predetermined threshold.7 That ﬁscal pact reduces the deﬁcit
bias as intended but also lowers the quality of ﬁscal policy.
5Others have already explored the design of ﬁscal rules when the quality of ﬁscal policy matters (e.g.
Peletier, Dur, and Swank, 1999, Castellani and Debrun, 2001, or Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). These
studies indeed end up advocating more sophisticated rules, such as caps on expenditure adjusted for
high-quality items.
6There is growing literature analyzing the linkages between macroeconomic and structural policies. On
the impact of the monetary regime on the incentives to implement structural reforms, key contributions
include Sibert (1999), Sibert and Sutherland (2000) and Calmfors (2001), whereas the ﬁscal-structural
nexus is analyzed in Hughes-Hallett and Jensen (2001), Grüner (2002), Hughes-Hallett, Jensen and Richter
(2004), Debrun and Annett (2004), and IMF (2004).
7In this stylized model, “sanctions” encompass both hard and soft dimensions of enforcement, that is
pecuniary sanctions and enhanced surveillance typically associated with the corrective arm of the Stability
and Growth Pact, and the peer pressure mechanism and early warnings operating under the preventive
arm of the Pact.
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enforcement (that is, the policymaker’s marginal disutility of excessive deﬁcits) and the
extent to which sanctions can be "waived" to account for the overall quality of ﬁscal policy,
reﬂecting a certain degree of "procedural ﬂexibility". With enforcement and procedural
ﬂexibility clearly distinct, we can characterize welfare-maximizing combinations.
We proceed in three steps providing speciﬁc analytical insights on desirable adjust-
ments of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). First, we characterize the socially-optimal
ﬁscal pact, assuming the SNA can perfectly monitor the quality of ﬁscal policy. In a
second step, we assume a suboptimal ﬁscal framework is in place and can be amended
only in part. This allows us to devise a number of partial but welfare-improving ﬁxes to
the ﬁscal framework. Finally, we examine the implications of budgetary opaqueness for
the feasibility and desirability of procedural ﬂexibility. For that purpose, we expand the
model to allow for a third expenditure item, namely unproductive spending (deﬁned as
socially useless programs beneﬁtting policymakers only). The assumption that the SNA
cannot distinguish unproductive programs from reform-related expenditure means that
the SNA is unaware of the underlying quality of the deﬁcit despite having full knowledge
of the deﬁcit and of the resources spent on the provision of public goods.
Our analysis points to the following key conclusions:
1. With transparent budgets, a ﬂexible implementation of ﬁscal pacts generally in-
creases their positive welfare eﬀects. Yet greater procedural ﬂexibility, while improv-
ing the quality of ﬁscal policy, weakens the disciplining role of ﬁscal pacts. As a
consequence, countries faced with a large deﬁcit bias need stricter enforcement and
less ﬂexibility while, all else being equal, those with greater needs of reforms should
be treated more ﬂexibly. In the euro area, the continued reluctance to carry out
structural reforms, and the persistent diﬃculty to exert ﬁscal restraint suggest that
amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact should aim at strengthening the en-
forcement of ﬁscal discipline while paying greater attention to the underlying causes
of excessive deﬁcits.
2. Still assuming transparent budgets, if the only possible reform of a suboptimal pact
concerns its enforcement mechanism, tighter enforcement is beneﬁcial only if either
procedural ﬂexibility or the overall quality of ﬁscal policy is suﬃciently high to start
with. Similarly, if the only possible reform concerns procedural ﬂexibility, increasing
ﬂexibility is welfare improving only if the marginal income gains expected from high-
quality spending are high enough. Finally, if neither ﬂexibility nor enforcement can
be eﬀectively reformed, the SNA can always increase the desirability of the existing
rules by setting a minimum threshold for high-quality outlays below which it will
never apply any procedural ﬂexibility.
3. If budgetary opaqueness hinders the SNA’s inquiry about the quality of ﬁscal pol-
icy, unconditional ﬂexibility makes the ﬁscal pact counter-productive. However,
Whereas the basic features of the pact are given – it is a deﬁcit rule reducing the
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shows only a limited tolerance for the lack of transparency by imposing a ceiling
on the overspending up to which it stands ready to waive sanctions. In that case,
we establish that a ﬁscal pact based on a straightforward deﬁcit rule with procedural
ﬂexibility restricted to relatively small ﬁscal slippages can simultaneously contain
excessive deﬁcits, lower unproductive spending and increase high-quality outlays.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model, while Section 3 introduces a ﬁscal pact as a disciplining mechanism and derives the
socially-optimal combination of enforcement and procedural ﬂexibility. Section 4 studies
the welfare eﬀects associated with partial reforms of a given stability pact. In Section 5,
we turn to the case of budgetary opaqueness. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the results
and draws policy implications. Key derivations and proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2T h e m o d e l
Our theoretical benchmark is a simple dynamic framework of a monetary union shar-
ing many key features with Beetsma and Debrun (2004). Each country is a small open
economy where both governments and households can freely borrow or lend in the inter-
national capital market at a given real interest rate, which, for convenience, is set at zero.
Assuming away cross-country spillovers, the formal analysis of the pact is carried out on a
single country, independently of other member states policy choices. The model has two
periods, denoted by subscripts 1 and 2.
The utility function of a representative private agent (social utility) is separable across
time and types of goods (public and private) so that we write:
V
S = E0 [u(c1)+v(q1)+u(c2)+v(q2)],
where ct denotes private consumption in period t, qt represents the consumption of a public
good in period t,a n du(.) and v(.) are the corresponding utility functions. E0 [.] denotes
expectations taken at the start of the game. These functions have usual properties, namely
u0 > 0,u 00 < 0,v 0 > 0 and v00 < 0. In addition, we assume v(0) = 0.F o r c o n v e n i e n c e ,
the social discount factor is set equal to unity. The agent’s budget constraints in periods
1 and 2 are
c1 =( 1 − θ)y1 − Iγ + ηγ + l,
c2 =( 1 − θ)y2 − l,
where y1 and y2 represent personal income in period 1 and 2, θ is a ﬂat income tax rate, γ
measures the amount of structural reforms (or, more generally of any public policy measure
that carries a direct short-term cost for the population but delivers future beneﬁts), I is
10
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by individuals in period 1,8 η is the marginal transfer received from the government in
case reforms are carried out and l designates the net liabilities of the private sector at
the end of period 1. In this model, the amount ηγ thus captures high-quality government
spending. To focus on the design and implementation of ﬁscal pacts, the model sticks to
t h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ea g e n t ’ sﬁction, thereby ignoring the distributive implications of ﬁscal
and structural policies. Hence, in period 1, each individual is aﬀected in the same way by
reforms and needs to receive the same compensation in order to support reforms.
First-period income is given, while second-period income depends on the amount of
structural reforms implemented in the ﬁrst period. More reforms (for example, in the labor
market) ensure that, after some adjustment period during which resources are reallocated,
the economy operates more eﬃciently and generates higher income. Accordingly, we have:
y1 = y, y2 = Γ(γ)y,
where y is exogenous (constant) and where Γ0 > 0 and Γ00 < 0.A l s o ,Γ0 →∞as γ → 0 and
Γ0 → 0 as γ →∞ . The properties of Γ exclude counterproductive reforms (future income
unambiguously increases when reforms are undertaken), and guarantee interior solutions.
The assumed decreasing returns of reforms reﬂect inevitable limits to the ability of tax and
regulatory instruments to improve the functioning of markets and deliver higher income.
Also, we assume that the beneﬁts from reforms materialize in the longer run whereas the
costs are felt immediately. This fairly typical time path reﬂects the economy’s adjustment
to the new structural conditions, as resources are shifted across sectors, possibly entailing
transitory unemployment (see IMF, 2004, for a survey of the relevant literature as well as
new evidence for industrial countries).
The rationale for a stability pact arises from a political deﬁcit bias reminiscent of
Alesina and Tabellini (1990). Accordingly, there are two political parties, F and G.
Nature draws the incumbent in period 1 but an election, whose outcome is uncertain,
takes place at the end of period 1.T h ep o l i c y m a k e ri no ﬃce decides on the provision of
a standard public good to the population. While private individuals are indiﬀerent about
the political color of the provider, politicians value the public good only to the extent
that they provide it themselves. Assuming that each party shares the preferences of the
representative individual in private consumption matters, the utility of party Q is:
V
Q = E0 [u(c1)+v(q1)+u(c2)+v(q2)+z (h) − kw(b)],k ≥ 0,
8As discussed in Blanchard (2004) and Beetsma and Debrun (2004), these costs include among other
things the loss of rents, typically because reforms enhance competition in goods and labor markets–
thereby eroding wage premia–, salary losses due to temporary unemployment accompanying the induced
reallocation of resources across sectors, and the temporarily higher unemployment associated with relaxing
ﬁring restrictions (IMF, 2004). See Beetsma and Debrun (2004) for speciﬁc examples of such costs in the
case of labor and product market reforms. Of course, the argument is also valid for other ﬁscal policy
measures, including the nuisance from the development of large public infrastructures, such as airports.
We summarize all these costs as foregone private consumption.
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t.9 At the beginning of the game (denoted by a subscript 0), expectations are calculated
over the stochastic processes governing uncertainty about the outcome of elections and
the quality of ﬁscal expenditure (in the case of budgetary opaqueness introduced later
in the analysis). In oﬃce, politicians also derive some utility z (h) > 0 from pork-barrel
spending h>0 , which we assume completely useless for the population at large. Initially,
the amount of pork-barrel spending is assumed to be zero, with z (0) = 0. Later, in Section
5, h will be chosen optimally, making use of the assumption that z0 > 0, and z00 < 0.
The policymaker’s utility is also aﬀected by an external discipline-enhancing mech-
anism (a “ﬁscal pact”) administered by a nonpoliticized supranational authority (SNA).
The pact reduces government’s utility by kw(b), where b is the ﬁscal deﬁcit, w0 ≥ 0,
and k captures the strictness of enforcement as perceived by the government (including
the probability of non-enforcement thanks to successful political pressures on the SNA or
the importance given to external commitments in domestic policy debates). This discipli-
nary mechanism is deﬁned in broad terms, encompassing any mechanism through which
the ﬁscal framework is likely to aﬀect policymakers’ behavior. For instance, to refer to
the speciﬁcs of the SGP, k covers the corrective arm of the Pact, which includes ﬁnan-
cial sanctions and enhanced monitoring, but also some soft enforcement aspects related
to the preventive arm, which includes peer pressure and early warnings (see European
Commission, 2004, and Schuknecht, 2004, who discusses the role of soft enforcement in
encouraging ﬁscal discipline). To ease the discussion, we will nevertheless refer to the term
“sanctions” to designate the pact-related disutility.
Without loss of generality, we assume that party F is in oﬃce during the ﬁrst period
and is re-elected for a second (and last) term with an exogenous probability p<1.
Electoral uncertainty – related to the occurrence of scandals or random voters’ turnout
aﬀecting both parties asymmetrically – raises government’s eﬀective discount rate above
the socially optimal value. Although policy actions involving intertemporal trade-oﬀs
(such as structural and ﬁscal policies) should in principle aﬀect re-election chances, the
present analysis economizes on the details of the political set-up to bring out the key
intuitions as clearly as possible, leaving for future research the analysis of a richer set of
political incentives on these trade-oﬀs.
The ﬁrst- and second-period per-capita government budget constraints are written as:
f1 + g1 + h = θy − ηγ + b, (1)
f2 + g2 = θΓ(γ)y − b. (2)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand sides represents tax revenues. Spending on public goods
and pork-barrel programs are on the left-hand sides. In the absence of output shocks, there
9Formally, the model would be identical if we assumed two types of public good, one exclusively
valued by party F and the other exclusively valued by party G,a sl o n ga st h ep u b l i cg o o d sa r ep e r f e c t l y
substitutable in individuals’ utility.
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the ﬁrst period, the government can issue debt, b, which is repaid in the second period.
Due to the absence of inherited liabilities, b is also the deﬁcit in period 1. As indicated
above, the term ηγ symbolizes the total public resources absorbed by the implementation
of pro-growth structural reforms γ, including compensatory transfers extended to ensure
the political acceptability of reforms. Even if the short-run costs of reform were aﬀecting
only a fraction of the population, the government might ﬁnd it politically easier to provide
net transfers in order to prevent the spillovers of social unrest to undermine the broader
support for the reform program. Under perfect budgetary transparency, the marginal
budgetary cost of reforms (η) is common knowledge, while budgetary opaqueness (see
Section 5) introduces uncertainty about the true value of η.
Regarding the implementation of the stability pact, procedural ﬂexibility is modeled
as sanctions waivers conditional upon the quality of ﬁscal policy–speciﬁcally on the
”amount” of structural reforms γ. This echoes the European Commission’s recent call
to ”introduce more economic rationale in the implementation of the stability and growth
pact.”10 In fact, the Council’s conclusions putting the Pact in abeyance for Germany
was partly motivated by the Commission’s own acknowledgement that the country had
undertaken signiﬁcant structural reforms that ”would boost potential growth and reduce
the deﬁc i ti nt h em e d i u mt ol o n gt e r m . ”
3 Optimal Pact under Budgetary Transparency and
No Pork-Barrel
In this section, an analytically tractable solution to our model is found under the as-
sumptions of a constant and perfectly observable η (full budgetary transparency) and
of no pork-barrel spending (h =0 ). This is an interesting benchmark for two reasons.
First, full transparency implies the absence of any obstacle to procedural ﬂexibility as
the SNA can easily monitor the budget and observe the link between an excessive deﬁcit
and reform-related spending. Second, these assumptions yield a complete characterization
of the optimal ﬁscal pact, and in particular of the equilibrium relationship between the
strictness of enforcement and procedural ﬂexibility.
T ok e e pt h ea l g e b r am a n a g e a b l e( a n da l s ob e c a u s ei np r a c t i c eo n l ys i m p l ep r o c e d u r e s
might be implementable), we assume a linear sanction scheme:11
10See ”Commission calls for stronger economic and budgetary coordination”, press communique
IP/04/1062, September 3, 2004.
11If b<δ η γand sanctions are pecuniary, the government would actually receive a transfer. Under our
assumptions, it is unclear who would ﬁnance such tranfers (see, however, Beetsma and Debrun, 2004).
Since the discussion of that particular case has no practical bearing, we simply assume that the re-election
probability p is low enough to entail excessive deﬁcits such that b>δ η γ .More generally, we will always
seek to restrict the formal analysis to constellations of parameters that turn out to be meaningful in terms
of the actual policy debate.
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In (3), procedural ﬂexibility amounts to adjusting the deﬁcit by a fraction δ of ηγ,t h e
total public resources absorbed by structural reforms (or, more generally, high quality
measures). A higher δ implies greater procedural ﬂexibility. The sanction scheme (3) also
allows to clearly separate enforcement k from ﬂexibility.
This highly stylized treatment of the ﬁscal framework calls for caution when mapping
the model’s results into speciﬁc reform proposals of the actual SGP. The model can only
illustrate some ﬁrst-order principles underlying welfare-improving ﬁscal pacts and multiple
reform proposals may be consistent with those principles. As clariﬁed in the Introduction,
we view δ as the extent to which our independent enforcer would be able to calibrate
”sanctions” to the speciﬁcs of an excessive deﬁcit case. An alternative interpretation of δ,
that is an extension of the rules-based approach allowing for particular corrections to the
actual deﬁcit, is admittedly impractical and prone to an even greater amount of creative
accounting (see e.g. von Hagen and Wolﬀ, 2004).
The timing is as follows. First, the government implements a structural reform of size
γ and simultaneously selects the deﬁcit. Then, the private agent sets l, taking as given
the government’s policies. Third, elections take place (beginning of period 2) and, ﬁnally,
all debts (private and public) are paid oﬀ.
The model is solved backwards to ensure time-consistency. Given the assumed zero
discount rate, the representative consumer chooses l such that consumption is constant
over time:
c1 = c2 = 1
2 [(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y +( η − I)γ]. (4)
At the initial stage of the game, the government chooses (γ,b) maximizing its expected
utility. Indeed, as the tax rate θ is given, and g1 =0(recall that party F is in power
in period 1), the optimal amount of public goods provided in period 1 (f1)i sd e r i v e d
from the budget constraint. Taking the budget constraints (1) and (2) into account, the
government maximizes
2u1 + v1 + pv2 + z (h) − k (b − δηγ), (5)
where u1 ≡ u
¡
1
2 [(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y +( η − I)γ]
¢
,v 1 ≡ v(θy − (h + ηγ)+b) and v2 ≡














2 + δηk =0 , (7)
12The strict concavity of the objective function ensures that the second-order conditions hold.
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H (γ) ≡ (1 − θ)yΓ
0 + η − I.
Condition (6) simply equates the marginal utility of ﬁrst-period deﬁcits (reﬂecting in-
creased public good provision) with its marginal cost, that is the discounted value of
foregone public good provision in period 2,13 to which we add the perceived marginal
cost of deﬁcits related to the enforcement of the ﬁscal pact. Similarly, condition (7) en-
sures that optimal reforms strike a balance between the marginal utility derived from
private-good consumption (which may be negative or positive), the marginal cost of lower
ﬁrst-period public good provision, the expected marginal utility of increased public good
provision in the second period, and the marginal utility derived by the government from
a ﬂexible implementation of the ﬁscal pact. Diﬀerentiating (6), we easily establish that
∂b/∂p = v0













> 0.( 8 )
Lemma 1 All else being equal, as far as the optimal choice of the deﬁcit is concerned,
more structural reforms increase the deﬁcit, while a higher re-election probability reduces
it.
The underlying intuition is straightforward. All else being equal, more structural
reforms γ subtract resources from the provision of public goods in period 1 to increase
resources available in the second period. The government ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀset the
intertemporal eﬀect of reforms through a larger deﬁcit, restoring its preferred time proﬁle
of public good provision. Another interpretation is that a higher deﬁcit acts like a tax on
the future beneﬁts of reforms, whose proceeds can then be used to compensate short-term
losses by households; that is, a higher deﬁcit allows spreading the net beneﬁts of reforms
over time.
Greater re-election chances raise the government’s expected utility from providing
public goods in period 2, and correspondingly reduce its relative impatience to spend in
period 1. As the wedge between the government’s eﬀective discount rate and Society’s is
reduced, the bias towards deﬁcits becomes smaller.
3.1 Comparison with a Social Planner
To formally assess the impact of the political distortion (p<1) on the representative
consumer’s utility (or social welfare), we ﬁrst compare the solution under a partisan gov-
ernment with that under a social planner. By deﬁnition, the latter faces no distortion
(p =1 ) and, therefore, no legal restraint on ﬁscal discretion (k =0 ). Appendix A for-
mally establishes the following proposition:
13Recall that, as the real interest rate is assumed to be zero, the government’s eﬀective discount factor
is equal to the probability of re-election.
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structural reforms boost second-period government’s revenues by a suﬃciently large amount
(θyΓ0 >η ). Then, (a) for a given amount of reforms, the deﬁcit is larger under a partisan
government than under a planner, while, allowing for reforms to adjust endogenously, this
holds if the present value of the net beneﬁt to the government’s revenues is not too large
(θyΓ0−η is not too large), and (b) reforms are less ambitious under a partisan government
than under a planner.
As suggested in the interpretation of Lemma 1, the risk of not being re-elected im-
plies that, in equilibrium, a partisan government simultaneously exhibits a bias towards
an excessive deﬁcit and a bias towards status quo in structural reforms. This character-
ization of the ﬁscal-structural policy mix captures fairly well the situation in many euro
area members states. It also underscores the challenge to simultaneously undertake ﬁscal
adjustment and structural reforms (Debrun and Annett, 2004).
Notice that the condition θyΓ0 >ηunderpinning these results simply states that as
re-election chances increase from p<1 to p =1 , a policymaker will only undertake
additional reforms perceived as ”productive”, in the sense of increasing total budgetary
resources over the two periods, and thereby the opportunity to provide more public goods.
In cases where the boost to second-period resources is suﬃciently large, the incentive for
reform is strong enough to push the optimal deﬁcit under the planner above the preferred
deﬁcit of a partisan government (recall Lemma 1).
3.2 Eﬀects of the Fiscal Pact on Deﬁcits and Reforms
We now examine the eﬀects of the ﬁscal pact’s key parameters on deﬁcits and reforms.
To ﬁnd out the eﬀect of stricter enforcement on the deﬁcit, we diﬀerentiate b with respect
to k and obtain db/dk = B1 + B2 (dγ/dk). As B1 < 0, and holding reforms constant,
stricter enforcement reduces the deﬁcit because the marginal disutility of issuing debt
is higher. To account for the indirect deﬁcit eﬀect of enforcement through the induced
adjustment in structural reforms, we totally diﬀerentiate (7) with respect to k and, after
some rearrangements, obtain dγ/dk = δA1 + A2 (db/dk), where
























We observe that, in the absence of any procedural ﬂexibility (δ =0 ), enforcing the pact’s
sanctions scheme only aﬀects reforms through the deﬁcit. Therefore, if a stricter enforce-
ment of the pact triggers a ﬁscal contraction (db/dk < 0), structural reforms are also
reduced (dγ/dk < 0), aggravating the status quo bias as the government spreads over
all spending items the cuts imposed by the additional constraint on period 1 resources.
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eﬀect of stricter enforcement on reforms (δA1 > 0).
Combining the total derivatives of (6) and (7), and solving yields:
db/dk =( δA1B2 + B1)/(1 − A2B2),d γ / d k =( δA1 + A2B1)/(1 − A2B2).
In Appendix B, we show that A2B2 < 1, so that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 For a given δ ≥ 0 but suﬃciently small, stricter enforcement of the pact
(a higher k) reduces both the deﬁcit and structural reforms.
Proposition 3 indicates that in cases where procedural ﬂexibility remains limited, tight-
ening the pact’s enforcement reduces the deﬁcit bias at the cost of a greater status quo
bias in reforms. Indeed, punishing deﬁcits with little attention to their underlying qual-
ity discourages the government to spend on measures designed to secure the necessary
support for reforms. Yet increasing procedural ﬂexibility conditionally on reform eﬀorts
is not necessarily a panacea. The reason is that granting more generous waivers in pro-
portion of reforms (i.e. increasing δ) weakens the disciplinary eﬀe c to fs t r i c te n f o r c e m e n t ,
as illustrated by the fact that the term δA1B2/(1 − A2B2) in the solution for db/dk is
positive.
To evaluate the impact of greater procedural ﬂexibility in equilibrium, we totally dif-
ferentiate (6) and (7) with respect to δ and solve the resulting equations to ﬁnd:
db/dδ = kA1B2/(1 − A2B2) > 0,d γ / d δ = kA1/(1 − A2B2) > 0.
Proposition 4 follows:
Proposition 4 Assuming the pact is eﬀectively enforced (i.e. k>0), greater procedural
ﬂexibility (i.e., a higher δ) increases structural reforms at the cost of a larger deﬁcit.
This again indicates that the government wishes to oﬀset the impact of reforms on the
intertemporal proﬁle of expenditures and revenues by spreading the budgetary costs and
beneﬁts of reforms over time. More generally, we ﬁnd that there are limits to procedural
ﬂexibility if the pact is to remain an eﬀective disciplinary device.
With these basic results in mind, we now characterize the optimal stability pact pre-
vailing under full budget transparency and the absence of pork-barrel programs.
3.3 The Optimal Fiscal Pact
The optimal stability pact is described by the following proposition:
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ing, there exists a combination of enforcement and procedural ﬂexibility (k,δ)=( ks,δ
s)
such that a partisan government is induced to select the socially-optimal mix of structural

















As u b s c r i p t“ s” indicates that we evaluate the derivative functions at the socially-
optimal combination (ks,δ
s). The proof of the proposition is straightforward. Substitute
(k,δ)=( ks,δ
s) into the government’s ﬁrst-order conditions (6) and (7), and conﬁrm
that (b,γ)=( bs,γs) is a solution of the resulting system of equations. Thanks to the
strict concavity of the government’s objective function, this is the unique solution for a
policymaker subject to the pact (ks,δ
s).
The intuition underlying the existence of such a pact is that we have two instruments
(enforcement and procedural ﬂexibility) to meet two objectives (reducing the deﬁcit bias
and promoting reforms). Due to the linearity of the government’s ﬁrst-order conditions in
(k,δ),i ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd a combination (k,δ) that delivers the social optimum.14
Proposition 5 shows that if the political bias towards deﬁcit is large–which occurs if p is
small–, strict enforcement is desirable (ks is large) whereas if the socially-optimal amount
of reforms is large (that is if Γ0
s and Hs are low), procedural ﬂexibility should be large as
well.
In the euro area, the lack of progress in the Lisbon Agenda of structural reforms, and
the persistent diﬃculty to exert ﬁscal restraint suggest that amendments to the Stability
a n dG r o w t hP a c ts h o u l dstrengthen the enforcement of ﬁscal discipline in the context of a
procedure paying greater attention to the underlying causes of the excessive deﬁcit. Given
the urgency of decisive reforms in a number of countries, the optimal ﬁscal pact might thus
resemble a combination of harsh sanctions for truly egregious ﬁscal behaviors.
But how could such a pact emerge in reality? By deﬁnition, a "perfect", socially
optimal pact could only emanate from a non-politicized institutions-building process (not
modelled here) in which the distortions related to electoral uncertainty would have no
place. A constitution designed by a non-political body and approved by referendum is
one possible incarnation of such a process. However, even the non-politicized design of
policy-making institutions is often constrained by history or pre-existing norms that are
hard to change. This is why the next section examines the welfare eﬀect of partially
reforming an existing, suboptimal ﬁscal pact.
4 Limited Amendments to Suboptimal Fiscal Pacts
Since November 2003, a broad consensus on the need to amend the Stability and Growth
Pact while preserving its essential features has emerged among policymakers and analysts.
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area’s ﬁscal framework can only be modiﬁed by unanimous consent of all 25 Member
States), it remains unclear how deeply the existing framework can be amended.15 In
a statement following their Scheveningen meeting in September 2004, the Ministers of
Economy and Finance of the European Union conﬁrmed that ”the Treaty should not be
changed and that changes to the regulations should be minimized, if necessary at all”. In
the context of our model, that situation suggests to study the conditions under which
limited changes to a given ﬁscal pact would increase welfare. We start with the case
of tightening enforcement while keeping procedural ﬂexibility constant. We then look
into the welfare impact of increasing procedural ﬂexibility for given enforcement. Finally,
taking procedural ﬂexibility and enforcement as irrevocably ﬁxed, we show that the SNA
could increase welfare by implementing ﬂexibility in a way that induces more reforms at
a limited cost in terms of ﬁscal discipline.
In practice, the last two cases may be most relevant because, as already illustrated
by the November 2002 Commission’s recommendations, implementation procedures can
be adjusted by a simple agreement between the Council and the Commission, without
formally revising the Treaty (Article 104 relating to the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure)
nor the Regulation (the Stability and Growth Pact itself). By contrast, the strictness of
enforcement is essentially dictated by the formal relationship between the Commission and
the Council and any change at that level would most probably require modiﬁcations in the
legal framework. Yet it has been argued, most notably by the European Central Bank,
that the SGP mainly suﬀers from a lack of enforcement and that procedural ﬂexibility is
suﬃcient. This is why the ﬁrst sub-section formally investigates that possibility.
4.1 Enforcing a Pact with Given Procedural Flexibility
To assess the basic trade-oﬀ,w ec a nc o m p u t et h ew e l f a r ee ﬀect of enforcing a sanction
scheme k(b − δηγ), starting from k =0and taking procedural ﬂexibility as given. Diﬀer-
entiating the social welfare function with respect to k, we evaluate the resulting expression




























This expression can be positive or negative as it simply describes the trade-oﬀ involved by
the decision to enforce sanctions against excessive deﬁcits. On the one hand, as revealed
in Proposition 3, punishing deﬁcits is generally expected to reduce them (db/dk < 0),
15See, for instance, Pisani-Ferry, 2002; Wyplosz, 2002; Buiter and Grafe, 2003; Calmfors and Corsetti,
2003; EEAG, 2003; Fatàs et al., 2004; and Eichengreen, 2004. Schuknecht (2004) is sceptical about the
need for reform and views the SGP as having been eﬀective so far, although not perfectly so.
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other hand, the gains from lower deﬁcits might be oﬀset by a more severe bias against
structural reforms (dγ/dk < 0), which would reduce welfare. From the second line of
(9), we can read oﬀ the sign of the overall welfare eﬀect. The ﬁrst factor inside square
brackets is unambiguously negative, while the denominator of the second factor inside
square brackets is unambiguously positive. Hence, the overall welfare eﬀect of enforcing
sanctions against excessive deﬁcits is determined by the numerator of that factor, leading
to the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Enforcing sanctions against excessive deﬁcits always raises welfare if pro-
cedural ﬂexibility is such that the SNA extends waivers for the full amount of high-quality
spending ηγ (i.e. δ =1 ). For smaller degrees of procedural ﬂexibility (δ<1), enforcing
sanctions raises welfare only if the expected marginal income gain from reforms (Γ0 > 0)
is suﬃciently small.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition establishes that procedural ﬂexibility improves the
terms of the trade-oﬀ between ﬁscal discipline and the status quo bias in reforms. Not
surprisingly, if the SNA calibrates sanctions so as to practically exonerate governments
from deﬁcits caused by high-quality spending, then the marginal welfare eﬀect of enforcing
sanctions is always positive as the pact would never punish such spending.16 Inevitably,
when ﬂexibility is limited, the trade-oﬀ between excessive deﬁcits and the under-reform
bias is less favorable and may even make enforcement counterproductive if the expected
marginal eﬀect of reforms on period-2 income is suﬃciently large. Hence, in an envi-
ronment where reforms are badly needed (that is when γ is low), rigid implementation
procedures are more likely to make enforcement counterproductive.
4.2 Increasing Procedural Flexibility with Given Enforcement
Turning to changes in the implementation procedure, we investigate whether, for a given
level of enforcement, greater procedural ﬂexibility could increase welfare. The following
proposition (demonstrated in Appendix E) answers that question.
Proposition 7 Assume that more ambitious structural reforms increase second-period tax
revenues by more than the ﬁrst-period marginal cost (θyΓ0 >η ).T h e n ,m o r eﬂexibility (a
higher δ) increases welfare.
Hence, in the case where additional reforms are suﬃciently “productive”, the fact
that raising δ encourages such reforms improves welfare, even though the deﬁcit rises
(recall Proposition 4). That result clearly hinges on the assumption of complete budgetary
transparency as the SNA can precisely assess the policies underlying a given deﬁcit and
grant waivers accordingly. In Section 5, we show that budgetary opaqueness reduces the
beneﬁts from ﬂexibility because it hinders the accuracy of SNA’s assessment.
16In that case, using (1), sanctions are given by k(f1 + g1 + h).
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The extent to which the legal framework can be amended and the inevitable limits within
which procedural ﬂexibility can change point to a third practical option to adjust the
implementation of the pact in a welfare improving way. In this subsection, we show that
the SNA can enhance the positive impact of sanction waivers on reforms while remaining
within the limits of existing procedural ﬂexibility. This is done by restricting waivers to
governments opting for suﬃciently ambitious reform programs. Formally, that implies a
more sophisticated sanction scheme for b>0:
w(b)=b, if γ<γ
∗,
w(b)=b − δηγ, if γ ≥ γ
∗, (10)
where γ∗ > 0 is the minimum reform eﬀort below which the SNA will never extend
waivers. By putting an extra premium on ambitious reform agendas, the limitations to
ﬂexibility implied by (10) can strengthen the reform-enhancing role of a given amount of
procedural ﬂexibility while preserving the disciplinary eﬀect of sanctions. In practice, the
exclusive attention to ambitious reforms also seems natural in view of the diﬃculty (and
the monitoring costs involved) to adjust sanctions for all reforms, including marginal ones.
Inevitably, the formal analysis of the policy game under (10) is slightly more compli-
cated than before. As far as the optimal ﬁscal policy is concerned, the ﬁrst-order condition
for the deﬁcit remains (6), irrespective of the extent of reforms. By contrast, ﬁnding the
optimal structural policy ﬁrst imposes to calculate two local optima corresponding to each
of the two intervals γ<γ ∗ and γ ≥ γ∗, and then identify the global optimum. Maximizing
2u1 + v1 + pv2 − kb over the interval γ<γ ∗ yields either γ = γ∗
− ≡ sup[γ|γ<γ ∗] or the








2 =0 and γ<γ
∗. (11)
Denote the solution for γ to the ﬁrst expression in (11) by γl. Maximizing 2u1+v1+pv2−
k(b − δηγ) over the interval γ ≥ γ∗ yields either the corner solution γ = γ∗ or the value
of γ that solves the combination (7) and γ>γ ∗.W ed e n o t et h es o l u t i o nf o rγ to (7) by
γh.
Figure 1 illustrates the government’s expected utility without a possibility for a waiver
(δ =0 ) and with a waiver (the linear sanction scheme). As the ﬁgure shows, an appropriate
choice of γ∗ >γ h induces the government to pick a more ambitious reform agenda than
under the simple, linear scheme studied before. The following proposition, of which the
proof is straightforward, formalizes this ﬁnding:
Proposition 8 For given enforcement and procedural ﬂexibility, the SNA can always de-
vise a sanction scheme (10) in which the minimum level of reforms required to beneﬁt
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than under the linear sanction scheme (3).
Having established that the SNA can provide incentives for additional structural re-
forms by amending the implementation procedure of the ﬁscal pact, it remains to check
whether this improves social welfare. Indeed, as extra reforms exacerbate the deﬁcit bias
(see Lemma 1), the welfare eﬀects are potentially ambiguous. In fact, the following Propo-
sition establishes that these extra reforms do raise welfare:
Proposition 9 Assume that more ambitious structural reforms increase second-period tax
revenues by more than the ﬁrst-period marginal cost (θyΓ0 >η ). For given enforcement, k,
and procedural ﬂexibility, δ, a sanction scheme restricting the beneﬁts of procedural ﬂexi-
bility to governments having opted for suﬃciently ambitious reforms (γ ≥ γ∗), raises social
welfare provided that the reform threshold γ∗, is set marginally above the optimal reform
package γh governments would have adopted under a simple linear sanction scheme.17
Proof. See Appendix G.
In the proof of this proposition, we consider γ∗ as a choice variable set by the SNA
and compute the marginal welfare eﬀect (evaluated at γ = γh) of an increase in γ∗.
As an intermediate step in the demonstration, we obtain an expression summarizing the













The ﬁrst two terms in (12) capture the tension between ﬁscal and structural policies at
the core of our model; that is, any reduction in the status quo bias against reforms comes
at the cost of additional spending that ends up aggravating the deﬁcit bias. Although
enforcing sanctions against excessive deﬁcits attenuates the ﬁscal slippage induced by
extra reforms (third term in (12)), that disciplinary eﬀect is undermined by the extent to
which procedural ﬂexibility waives sanctions in case of reforms (fourth term in (12)).





















where all terms are again evaluated at γ = γh. That expression is positive if the mar-
ginal eﬀect of reforms on period-2 ﬁscal revenues is suﬃciently large, which is indeed the
case under the now familiar condition that θyΓ0 >η . Since both enforcement and proce-
dural ﬂexibility were held constant with respect to the linear sanction scheme, restricting
the beneﬁts of ﬂexibility to ambitious reforms can always improve welfare. However,
to preserve analytical tractability, the remainder of the analysis is conducted under the
assumption of a simple linear punishment scheme.
17Appendix F shows that Max[γl,γh]=γh.
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When procedural ﬂexibility is based on the overall quality of ﬁscal policy, the lack of
budget transparency is a potentially serious obstacle. Since only governments know the
true ﬁscal implications of structural reforms and may not truthfully share that information
with the SNA, our case for a "smart" implementation of simple rules may be weaker than
in the case of perfect information. To put it bluntly, ﬂexibility may create loopholes
allowing policymakers to outsmart the enforcer. This could happen through creative
accounting practices (Milesi-Ferretti, 2003; for suggestive Euro-area empirical evidence,
see Von Hagen and Wolﬀ, 2004), or more pragmatically, by overstating the budgetary
impact of certain reforms. This section demonstrates that budgetary opaqueness does
not negate the case for ﬂexibility, but that it calls for greater caution in its execution.
Incidentally, we also highlight a new channel through which budgetary transparency may
entail welfare gains.
To enrich the formal analysis of budgetary opaqueness, we now assume that govern-
ments have private incentives to spend on socially-useless programs (pork-barrel spending).
Examples of such programs include favors to the government’s own constituency or the
creation of jobs through infrastructure work with minimal social returns. Such programs
may generate ﬁnancial or other beneﬁts (such as enhanced political support or better
future job prospects) for members of the government.
That new political distortion (the other one being the eﬀect of electoral uncertainty
on governments’ eﬀective time preference) has ﬁrst-order implications for the quality of
a ﬁscal policy subject to simple deﬁcit rules. Most importantly, it negates the trade-oﬀ
between the deﬁcit and the anti-reform bias, allowing us to establish that simple deﬁcit
rules implemented with due regard for the quality of underlying policies can simultaneously
reduce the deﬁcit and increase high-quality outlays.
5.1 Opaque Budgets and the Gains from Flexibility
To model the lack of budgetary transparency, we assume that the SNA cannot distinguish
between pork-barrel programs h and high-quality spending ηγ because information about
t h et r u ev a l u eo fb o t hh and η is known by the government only. However, the amount
of reforms, γ,a n dt h etotal amount not spent on public goods h + ηγ remains common
knowledge. As we see from (1), the latter is compatible with the assumption that total
spending on public goods, tax revenues and the deﬁcit are perfectly observable. In practice,
this may not be the case as misreporting or creative accounting practices make the true
deﬁcit imperfectly observable. The way we model opaqueness simply has the advantage of
being directly related to one key objection to procedural ﬂexibility, namely the diﬃculty
to assess the quality of ﬁscal policy.
Under opaqueness, the budgetary impact of the two political distortions is blurred,
complicating the SNA’s task to extend waivers proportional to reform-related expenditures
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large in relation to the observed reform agenda γ, the SNA would plausibly be more
likely to conclude that the government has opted for large pork-barrel programs, while
the opposite conclusion would be reached if h + ηγ is small in relation to γ. Barring
any improvement in budget monitoring or transparency, we conjecture that it would be
desirable for the SNA to exert ﬂexibility only in cases where h is likely to be small, that is
when the observed h +ηγ is suﬃciently low in comparison to the amount of reforms. We
thus assume a threshold value γ¯ s for h + ηγ such that below γ¯ s, the SNA stands ready
to show ﬂexibility, while above γ¯ s, the sanction scheme will be fully enforced, excluding
any waiver. The parameter ¯ s can thus be interpreted as the SNA’s relative tolerance for
opaqueness, or alternatively, its readiness to give governments the beneﬁt of the doubt.
Let us label the SNA’s decision rule about waivers, the "restricted waiver policy" or RWP.
In this new game, the timing of events is as follows. First, γ, b and h are chosen.
Then, η is observed by the government, which is followed by the representative consumer
selecting her optimal proﬁle of private consumption. Next, at the beginning of period 2,
elections take place and, ﬁnally, all debts are paid oﬀ.
The government sets γ, b and h maximizing the following objective function:
E{2u1 + v [θy − (h + ηγ)+b]+pv[θΓ(γ)y − b]+z (h) − kw(b)}.
To check the validity of our conjecture about the desirability of the RWP, we look at
two alternatives, namely never extending waivers or always granting waivers, irrespective
o ft h es i z eo fh + ηγ. In the former case, governments expect the ﬁscal pact to inﬂict a
disutility from deﬁcit equivalent to
kE[w(b)] = kb, (13)
so that the set of ﬁrst-order conditions for, b, γ and h are (41), (42) and (43) respectively,—
see Appendix I. Instead, when waivers are always granted, then governments expect a
pact-related disutility from deﬁcits of
kE[w(b)] = k[b − δ(h +¯ ηγ)], (14)
and the ﬁrst-order conditions become (41), (44) and (45) in Appendix I.
To keep the analysis of the RWP tractable, we assume that η is uniformly distributed
over the interval [¯ η − σ,¯ η + σ],w h e r e¯ η ≥ σ. Hence, based on the SNA’s decision rule
under RWP, governments would then expect the disutility from the deﬁcit to be (see
Appendix I):
kE[w(b)] = kb− 1
4kδγ
©
[2(h/γ +¯ η) − σ]+
£
¯ s
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with the second term on the right-hand side of (15) representing the expected waiver under
RWP. It is easy to see from (15) that expected waivers are non-negative if (16) holds, and
that they are strictly decreasing in (h/γ +¯ η), the size of non-transparent expenditure
(including pork-barrel programs h) in relation to reforms.











[2(h/γ +¯ η) − σ]+
£
¯ s




2 (kδh/γ)[(h/γ +¯ η)/σ − 1], (17)
z
0 (h)=1
2kδ[(h/γ +¯ η)/σ − 1] + E[v
0
1]. (18)
As in previous sections, the basic principles underlying the eﬀect of a ﬁscal pact’s key
features on equilibrium policies can be obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order
conditions. Focusing on the interesting case where (16) holds, we derive the following
proposition (see Appendix I).
Proposition 10 Holding constant γ and h, the response of the deﬁcit to the introduction
or adjustment of a pact is such that ∂b/∂k < 0, ∂b/∂δ =0 , and ∂b/∂¯ s =0 , while if b
and h are frozen, the response of reforms can be described as ∂γ/∂k > 0, ∂γ/∂δ > 0 and
∂γ/∂¯ s>0. Finally, with b and γ constant, the ﬁscal pact aﬀects pork-barrel spending as
follows: ∂h/∂k < 0, ∂h/∂δ < 0 and ∂h/∂¯ s =0 .
The novelty is that the SNA’s tolerance for opaqueness (¯ s) is now a parameter of the
pact, along with the strictness of enforcement (k), and procedural ﬂexibility (δ), and that
it emerges as a complement of the latter in promoting structural reforms. Another novel
element is the role played by the pact’s parameters through the expected sanctions for
excessive deﬁcit as calculated by governments. This most notably aﬀects the response of
pork-barrel spending to greater procedural ﬂexibility. Speciﬁcally, we see that, for given
deﬁcits and reforms, ﬂexibility contributes to discourage unproductive outlays in spite
of the fact it boosts the value of waivers associated with non-transparent expenditure
in general. The reason is that any induced increase in pork-barrel spending would in
fact augment the risk of that larger waiver being denied. Moreover, for a given risk of
not receiving the waiver, greater ﬂexibility increases the corresponding loss, encouraging
governments to reallocate resources away from pork-barrel programs and into reform-
enhancing expenditures – as such reallocation reduces that risk. A similar reasoning
holds for tighter enforcement, k.
18If ¯ s−h/γ falls outside (16), the RWP unravels to one of the two alternatives, that is waivers are either
always granted or always denied. The latter applies if ¯ s − h/γ ≤ ¯ η − σ and the relevant set of ﬁrst-order
conditions is (41)-(43) and this condition. The former applies if ¯ s − h/γ ≥ ¯ η + σ and the relevant set of
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the eﬀects of the ﬁscal pact on public deﬁcits, the structure of public expenditure, and





2 (ξ − 1)x
2 + ξx, x < ξ/(ξ − 1), (19)
where we impose x<ξ / (ξ − 1) to keep marginal utilities strictly positive. The para-
meter ω stands for the relative attractiveness of pork-barrel spending for the incumbent
government. Future income is linked to present reforms by a power function:
Γ(γ)=γ
q. (20)
The baseline parameter combination is ξ =1 .1,y=5 ,p= θ =0 .5,ω= I =1 , ¯ η =0 .75,
σ =0 .5 and q =0 .25.T h ev a l u eo fy determines the size of the economy and can be chosen
arbitrarily, while the value of ξ is such that marginal utilities are always positive. Given the
highly stylized nature of the model, it is diﬃcult to pin down ”plausible” parameter values
using hard data. We thus check the robustness of our results for a wide range of parameter
combinations. Speciﬁcally, we have considered all parameter combinations formed by the
Carthesian product of p,θ,σ ∈ {0.25,0.75}, ω ∈ {0.75,2}, I ∈ {0.5,2}, ¯ η ∈ {0.5,1} and
q ∈ {0.1,0.25,0.5}.H e n c e , t h e t a x r a t e θ and the re-election probability p vary over
wide ranges that cover, respectively, the GDP-shares of the public sector in advanced
economies and the chances that incumbent governments in democratic countries remain
in oﬃce after elections. The support of the compensation cost distribution varies over a
wide range relative to its mean. Finally, to provide some perspective on the budgetary and
eﬃciency eﬀects of reform, we notice that under the baseline reported in Table 1 below,
second-period GDP exceeds ﬁrst-period GDP by 8.5%, as a result of the reform,19 while
the net private contribution to the reform is about 7% of GDP.
We now proceed as follows. First, we look at the response of the deﬁcit, reforms,
pork-barrel spending, and social welfare to the introduction of a ﬁscal pact, excluding
any procedural ﬂexibility. Second, given a certain degree of enforcement, we look at
the consequences of introducing procedural ﬂexibility (that is we evaluate the impact
of marginally increasing δ, starting at δ =0 ), assuming that the SNA grants waivers
irrespective of h + ηγ (unrestricted procedural ﬂexibility). Given combinations of (k,δ),
the third and ﬁnal step is to search for the optimal value of ¯ s, that is the extent to which
the SNA should give governments the beneﬁt of the doubt regarding the true budgetary
eﬀect of reforms.
Table 1 summarizes the ﬁrst step of our investigation where we consider the eﬀects
of introducing a stability pact with a rigid implementation procedure.20 Unsurprisingly,
19This also seems reasonable in comparison to existing estimates of the beneﬁts from structural reforms.
For instance, the IMF (2003) estimates that if European labor and product markets were as competitive
as in the U.S., European GDP would be 10 percent higher.
20That exercise thus yields the marginal eﬀect on social utility of enforcing a stability pact starting at
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thereby partly alleviating the consequences of our two political distortions.21 However,
spending cuts also concern reform-facilitating items, and thus aggravate the anti-reform
bias. The overall welfare eﬀect is nevertheless positive:
Result 1 For all parameter combinations considered here, the marginal welfare eﬀect
of enforcing a ﬁscal pact with no procedural ﬂexibility (δ =0 ) is positive.
Table 1: Marginal eﬀects of enforcing a ﬁscal pact










baseline + − − −
p = .25 + − − −
p = .75 + − − −
θ = .25 + − − −
θ = .75 + − − −
σ = .25 + − − −
σ = .75 + − − −
¯ η = .5 + − − −
¯ η =1 + − − −
ω = .75 + − − −
ω =2 + − − −
I = .5 + − − −
I =2 + − − −
q = .1 + − − −
q = .5 + − − −
Note: to focus on cases where h is positive, we do not report results for ω<0.75 (see
Footnote 24 below). We always vary one parameter, while keeping the others at their
baseline values.
We now examine whether procedural ﬂexibility can reduce the collateral damage of
the pact in terms of high-quality outlays if sanctions for excessive deﬁcits are waived
proportionally to spending unrelated to public good provision (that is, h + ηγ). For that
purpose, Table 2 presents the marginal eﬀects of introducing procedural ﬂexibility, taking
enforcement k as given, and assuming that the SNA always grants waivers proportion-
ally to (h + ηγ). Procedural ﬂexibility loosens the disciplinary eﬀect of the pact as the
k =0(no-enforcement), while keeping δ =0 . The relevant system of ﬁrst-order conditions is given by
(41)-(43).
21As indicated earlier, one should bear in mind that none of the resulting solutions produces the socially-
optimal allocation, because a ﬁscal pact with ﬁrst-order eﬀects on intertemporal choices cannot deal with
the purely intratemporal distortion associated with pork-barrel spending.
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measures–increase. Regarding welfare, we ﬁnd that:
Result 2 For all parameter combinations considered here, the marginal welfare eﬀect
of introducing unrestricted procedural ﬂexibility is negative.
In other words, introducing unrestricted procedural ﬂexibility is never socially desirable.
This conﬁrms our conjecture that opaqueness should lead the SNA to opt for a restricted
waiver policy (RWP) by which ﬂexibility would be considered only in cases of limited ﬁscal
slippages attributed to structural reforms (or other high-quality spending).
Table 2: Marginal eﬀects of introducing unrestricted procedural ﬂexibility


























k =0 .1 k = .25 k = .5
baseline − + + + − + + + − + + +
p = .25 − + + + − + + + − + + +
p = .75 − + + + − + + + − + + +
θ = .25 − + + + − + + + − + + +
θ = .75 − + + + − + + + − + + +
σ = .25 − + + + − + + + − + + +
σ = .75 − + + + − + + + − + + +
¯ η = .5 − + + + − + + + − + + +
¯ η =1 − + + + − + + + − + + +
ω = .75 − + + + − + + + − + + +
ω =2 − + + + − + + + − + + +
I = .5 − + + + − + + + − + + +
I =2 − + + + − + + + − + + +
q = .1 − + + + − + + + − + + +
q = .5 − + + + − + + + − + + +
Note: see Note to Table 1.
Table 3 looks into the eﬀects of the RWP,22 according to which ﬂexibility will be
denied if the sum of non-transparent spending items h + ηγ is deemed excessive by the
SNA. In addition to k and δ, the relative weight attached to pork-barrel programs (ω)a n d
the extent of budgetary opaqueness (σ) are allowed to take diﬀerent values, while other
parameters are kept equal to their baseline value.23 We look at the equilibrium under
22This is done for a given k by changing δ while optimally adjusting ¯ s.
23All the results hold for a much wider range of parameter combinations than those reported in Table
3. In particular, we investigated each combination (except those where σ>¯ η) formed by the Carthesian
product of p,θ,σ ∈ {0.25,0.75}, ω ∈ {0.75,2}, I ∈ {0.5,2}, ¯ η ∈ {0.5,1}, q ∈ {0.1,0.25,0.5}, k ∈
{0.1,0.25} and δ ∈ {0.1,0.25,0.5,1}.
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solutions support the novel insights of Proposition 10 regarding the impact of procedural
ﬂexibility on the reallocation of public resources away from pork-barrel spending and in
favor of reforms.24 What is more, ﬂexibility leads in most cases to a lower deﬁcit. To
summarize:
Result 3 Under budgetary opaqueness, the restricted waiver policy allows procedural
ﬂexibility to improve the equilibrium structure of public expenditure, possibly destroying
the trade-oﬀ between the deﬁcit bias and reform-related expenditure.
From the perspective of rational governments, greater ﬂexibility under the RWP raises
the cost of being denied a waiver–recall that a higher δ leads to more generous waivers.
In response, they trim the deﬁcit, and reduce the probability of having their request for
waiver turned down – by increasing the funding for reforms, and reducing unproductive
expenditure. Consequently, greater procedural ﬂexibility can increase social welfare even
though the SNA cannot appraise the exact budgetary costs of reforms!
Does the penchant for pork-barrel programs (ω)a ﬀect the results? The numerical
solutions reported in Table 3 indicate that an increase in ω not only shifts resources in
favor of these programs, but also aggravates the deﬁcit bias as the policymaker optimally
shifts part of the cost to period 2 as well. This has two conﬂicting eﬀects on reforms;
a direct – negative – crowding-out eﬀect, and a positive eﬀect reﬂecting governments’
eﬀort to limit the risk of no-access to waivers (recall that the latter increases with the size
of non-transparent expenditure in relation to reforms). Interestingly, the second eﬀect
dominates in most cases.
Before concluding this analysis, we compare the RWP to its two alternatives, namely
unrestricted waivers (that is, irrespective of the level of h/γ + η, so that the equilibrium
is determined by (41), (44) and (45)) or total absence of waivers (that is δ =0 ;a n dt h e
equilibrium is determined by (41)-(43)). The corresponding social welfare levels shown in
Table 3 support our initial conjecture that the RWP dominates the alternatives:
Result 4 Under budgetary opaqueness, procedural ﬂexibility with restricted waivers is
socially preferable to either the absence of procedural ﬂexibility or unlimited ﬂexibility (i.e.
unrestricted waivers).
24Pork-barrel spending is sometimes reported to be negative. This has no bearing on the formal validity
of the model since the latter only hinges on all marginal utilities being always positive, which is indeed
the case in all solutions presented here (for all possible realizations of η). The restriction h ≥ 0 was
introduced earlier for the sole purpose of straightforward interpretations.
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and 8 - 11 characterize the equilibrium obtained from the set of ﬁrst-order conditions
(41), (17) - (18). V NW
S is the social welfare level corresponding to the absence of
ﬂexibility (“Never Waiver”), that is the solution obtained with the set of ﬁrst-order
conditions (41) - (43). V AW
S is the social welfare associated with the unrestricted waiver
policy (“Always Waiver”), that is the solution obtained with the set of ﬁrst-order
conditions (41), (44) - (45). Finally, the negative utility levels reported in some instances
reﬂect negative values for private consumption or second-period public spending. We do
not discuss these economically meaningless cases.
5.2 The Beneﬁts of Budgetary Transparency
Interestingly, our analysis illustrates a new channel through which transparency in public
sector accounts might increase Society’s welfare. In our simple model where exogeneous
political distortions justify the introduction of a rules-based ﬁscal framework intended
(ω,k,δ) VS b γ h V NW
S V AW
S VS b γ h V NW
S V AW
S
σ =0 .25 σ =0 .75
(.75,.1,.1) 6.53 3.76 1.37 1.25 6.26 6.19 6.31 3.81 1.26 1.45 6.24 6.16
(.75,.1,.25) 6.82 3.59 1.42 0.97 6.26 6.08 6.41 3.77 1.28 1.36 6.24 6.04
(.75,.1,.5) 7.15 3.38 1.43 0.64 6.26 5.91 6.54 3.70 1.30 1.23 6.24 5.86
(.75,.1,1) 7.54 3.11 1.39 0.25 6.26 5.58 6.73 3.59 1.33 1.04 6.24 5.51
(.75,.25,.1) 7.91 1.94 1.13 0.27 7.58 7.39 7.63 2.08 1.08 0.54 7.56 7.35
(.75,.25,.25) 8.15 1.83 1.22 0.01 7.58 7.11 7.71 2.02 1.08 0.45 7.56 7.07
(.75,.25,.5) 8.34 1.71 1.25 -0.19 7.58 6.70 7.80 1.96 1.08 0.36 7.56 6.63
(.75,.25,1) 8.50 1.63 1.31 -0.38 7.58 6.05 7.90 1.89 1.08 0.25 7.56 5.90
(1,.1,.1) 4.70 4.96 1.51 2.92 4.31 4.24 4.42 4.99 1.29 3.18 4.28 4.21
(1,.1,.25) 5.10 4.82 1.70 2.52 4.31 4.14 4.58 4.94 1.38 3.02 4.28 4.11
(1,.1,.5) 5.59 4.59 1.84 2.05 4.31 3.98 4.79 4.87 1.48 2.81 4.28 3.94
(1,.1,1) 6.27 4.19 1.89 1.40 4.31 3.69 5.11 4.74 1.61 2.50 4.28 3.63
(1,.25,.1) 6.33 3.15 1.36 1.85 5.59 5.42 5.84 3.32 1.16 2.31 5.57 5.39
(1,.25,.25) 6.93 2.80 1.44 1.25 5.59 5.16 6.11 3.20 1.25 2.04 5.57 5.12
(1,.25,.5) 7.50 2.38 1.38 0.68 5.59 4.78 6.43 3.04 1.32 1.73 5.57 4.72
(1,.25,1) 8.01 1.92 1.20 0.16 5.59 4.17 6.83 2.80 1.37 1.33 5.57 4.05
(2,.1,.1) 0.49 7.43 1.91 6.25 0.21 0.17 0.32 7.28 1.44 6.47 0.19 0.14
(2,.1,.25) 0.67 7.54 2.44 5.92 0.21 0.10 0.43 7.34 1.69 6.32 0.19 0.07
(2,.1,.5) 0.88 7.60 3.01 5.51 0.21 -0.02 0.55 7.40 1.99 6.13 0.19 -0.05
(2,.1,1) 1.23 7.59 3.69 4.89 0.21 -0.22 0.71 7.45 2.38 5.84 0.19 -0.26
(2,.25,.1) 1.94 6.07 2.15 5.48 1.35 1.22 1.62 5.93 1.50 5.88 1.33 1.20
(2,.25,.25) 2.33 6.09 2.82 4.89 1.35 1.04 1.83 5.99 1.88 5.61 1.33 1.01
(2,.25,.5) 2.85 5.96 3.40 4.19 1.35 0.78 2.05 6.00 2.25 5.29 1.33 0.73
(2,.25,1) 3.79 5.53 3.83 3.17 1.35 0.33 2.36 5.97 2.70 4.82 1.33 0.26
Table 3: Comparing equilibria under RWP and its alternatives
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better25 implementation of the rules-based framework.
To see this, we ﬁrst assess the direct impact of a change in transparency (σ)o no p t i m a l
policies. Under RWP and assuming that ¯ η−σ<¯ s−h/γ < ¯ η+σ, Appendix I demonstrates
the following Proposition:
Proposition 11 Holding constant the other two policy instruments in each case, the re-
sponse of the policy mix to a change in budgetary transparency is such that ∂b/∂σ =0 ,
∂γ/∂σ < 0 (if ¯ s>¯ η)a n d∂h/∂σ > 0.
In words, an increase in budgetary transparency (that is, a smaller σ)c l a r i ﬁes the
distinction between reform-enhancing and unproductive spending, helping the SNA in
deciding whether or not to show ﬂexibility. The government thus faces greater incentives
to shift resources away from pork-barrel programs and into reform-enhancing measures.
Turning to the complete, numerical solutions, Table 3 makes clear that for all parameter
combinations under review, social welfare increases with transparency (decreases with σ).26
This allows us to conclude that:
Result 5 All else being equal, an increase in budgetary transparency raises social
welfare.
In the limit case of full transparency (σ =0 ) , waivers are made contingent on com-
pensation spending only and w(b) is given by (3).27 Table 4 shows that in all cases under
review, ﬂexibility encourages additional reforms at the cost of higher deﬁcits, in line with
Proposition 4, demonstrated above in the case where h =0 . However, the eﬀect on pork-
barrel spending is ambiguous. On the one hand ﬂexibility relaxes the incentive to reduce
deﬁcits, while on the other hand the cost associated with the enhanced reform incentives
crowds out unproductive spending.
25That is an implementation more mindful of the rules’ potentially adverse consequences on the quality
of ﬁscal policy.
26We thus hold the other parameters constant and assume the SNA’s tolerance for opaqueness, ¯ sopt,i s
optimally adjusted.
27Appendix H contains the derivations for this case.
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k =0 .1 k = .25 k = .5
baseline + + + − + + + − + + + −
p = .25 − + + − + + + − + + + −
p = .75 + + + − + + + − + + + −
θ = .25 − + + − + + + − + + + −
θ = .75 + + + + + + + + + + + +
η = .5 + + + + + + + + + + + +
η =1 − + + − + + + − + + + −
ω = .75 − + + − + + + − + + + −
ω =2 + + + − + + + − + + + +
I = .5 − + + − + + + − + + + −
I =2 + + + + + + + + + + + +
q = .1 + + + − + + + − + + + −
q = .5 + + + − + + + − + + + −
Note: see Note to Table 1.
Although ﬂexibility does not necessarily entail net welfare gains – see in particular
the second column of Table 4 – , this is more likely to be the case under stricter enforce-
ment (that is if k is higher). Hence, if a ﬁscal pact is characterized by low enforcement
(i.e. a low k), introducing procedural ﬂexibility is potentially harmful because the disci-
plinary eﬀect of the arrangement may become too weak. By contrast, procedural ﬂexibility
helps make strict enforcement (i.e. a high k) more easily ”acceptable” for the public (and
indirectly, governments) as corresponding welfare levels increase for all parameter con-
stellations considered here.28 This is in sharp contrast with the results obtained for the
unrestricted waiver policy under imperfect information, where procedural ﬂexibility never
improves welfare.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Practically since its inception, the Stability and Growth Pact has been under ﬁerce crit-
icism. Some have argued that the Pact’s basic design was fundamentally ﬂawed, and
consequently harmful for member states. Other critics focused on the Pact’s implemen-
tation, indicating that its constraining elements (in particular the sanctions) could not
be enforced. In the aftermath of the November 2003 events, reforming the SGP became
inevitable and a large number of proposals have been put forward to “improve” the euro
area’s ﬁscal architecture. However, many of the proposed reforms are substantial, some
requiring signiﬁcant amendments to the Regulations supporting the SGP or even revisions
to the Treaty establishing the European Union, all options now explicitly rejected by the
28We conﬁrm this result also for the much wider range of parameter combinations reported in Footnote
2 3 ,e x c e p tt h a tw en o ws e tσ =0in the Carthesian product deﬁning the parameter space.
Table 4: Marginal eﬀects of introducing procedural ﬂexibility
(evaluated at δ =0 )
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to enhance the economic rationale underlying the implementation of the Pact.
The aim of this paper was to capture in a simple theoretical set-up some broad trade-
oﬀs pertaining to the current debate about feasible SGP reforms. We explored the con-
ditions under which procedural ﬂexibility–which a priori does not imply deep regulatory
changes–could increase the eﬀectiveness of the framework. Given the diﬃculties associ-
ated with self-enforcement, such eﬀectiveness clearly depends on the perceived desirability
of the pact by member states. With that in mind, we have shown that the ﬂexible im-
plementation of a simple, rules-based ﬁscal framework can increase the desirability of the
arrangement for participating countries, thus containing the risk of enforcement deadlocks.
Overall, the model suggests that procedural ﬂexibility based on an independent and
non-politicized judgment might well strengthen the SGP. However, it also identiﬁes two
cardinal conditions for that to be the case. First, an increase in procedural ﬂexibility
should not be confused with a loosening of enforcement. On the contrary, enforcement
should be strengthened to ensure that governments actually expect to pay some price for
unwarranted proﬂigacy. In such a scenario, the application of the corrective dimension
of the pact would probably be limited to truly unacceptable ﬁscal behaviors so that vio-
lators ﬁnd themselves isolated and unable to form coalitions inside the Council to block
enforcement. Second, as budgetary opaqueness provides opportunities to abuse procedural
ﬂexibility, the latter should be exerted with caution, in practice excluding large ﬁscal slip-
pages. Improving transparency and budgetary surveillance is thus an important step to
secure the beneﬁts from an increase in procedural ﬂexibility. In fact, a practical implica-
tion of the model is that, when pondering the option of granting a waiver, the SNA should
only consider those structural reforms with the most easily traceable budgetary impact.
Inevitably, a stylized model aimed at characterizing some ﬁrst-order principles underly-
ing the implementation of ﬁscal rules tends to neglect the operational obstacles associated
with a ﬂexible implementation of a ﬁscal pact. In particular, limited information on the
concrete extent of a reform package, or on its future pay-oﬀsm a k e si td i ﬃcult to assess
the desirable degree of ﬂexibility the SNA should have in authorizing deviations from the
letter of the rule. Our analysis can only suggest that great caution should be exerted.
Another element not explicitly addressed here but that matters for the Pact’s legitimacy,
is that limited budgetary transparency prevents an even-handed application of the rules.
Finally, the model also abstracts from the politics of implementation, and simply un-
derscores the well-known virtue of a non-politicized implementation of rules supposed to
correct the eﬀects of political bias. Exploring implementation mechanisms that internalize
these important constraints is an important topic for further research.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
The ﬁrst part of Part (a) follows immediately from Part (a) of Lemma 1. To prove the






























of which the ﬁrst factor is positive (as shown in the next Appendix), the second factor
is negative and the third factor is is positive if θyΓ0 − η>0 is not too large. Hence, if
θyΓ0 − η>0 is not too large, db/dp < 0.
To prove part (b), we ﬁrst substitute (6) into (7). We can rewrite the result as:
Hu
0
1 =( η − θyΓ
0)pv
0
2 + η(1 − δ)k. (21)
Set k =0 . Assume that θyΓ0 >η . For given γ, the term on the left-hand side of (21)
is the same both under a partisan government and a planner and, moreover, this term
is decreasing in γ.F u r t h e r ,f o ra n yg i v e nγ, the right-hand side of (21) is smaller (more
negative) under a planner (p =1 ) than under a partisan government (p<1). Hence, a
solution for γ under a planner must exceed that under a partisan government.
































































































































































which completes the proof that A2B2 < 1.
C Example of an optimal pact
Assume that:
u(x)=v (x)=−1
2 (ξ − 1)x
2 + ξx, x < ξ/(ξ − 1).
Hence, (6) becomes:29
−(ξ − 1)[θy − ηγ + b]+ξ = k + p(ξ − 1)[b − θΓ(γ)y]+pξ ⇔
b =
(1 − p)ξ − k
(1 + p)(ξ − 1)
+
θy[pΓ(γ) − 1] + (h + ηγ)
1+p
.
By equating the outcome for the deﬁcit under a partisan government with that under a




2 (1 − p){2ξ +( ξ − 1)[(h + ηγ
s) − (1 + Γ(γ
s))θy]} > 0.
We observe that a higher h or a higher γs requires a higher ks, because the government
wants to shift part of the increase in h or γs to the future by raising the deﬁcit. A larger
productivity gain for a given level of reform (a higher Γ(γs) given γs) requires a fall in ks,
because it is socially optimal to bring some of the productivity gains to the ﬁrst period.
Using (7), we can compute the optimal value δ












where the subscript “s” is used to indicate that we evaluate at b = bs and γ = γs.
Let us give a numerical example. Assume that ξ =1 .1,y=5 ,p= θ =0 .5,η=0 .75,
I =1 .0,h=0and Γ(γ)=γ0.25.T h e nw eﬁnd that bs =0 .59,γ s =1 .33,k s =0 .45 and
δ
s =0 .67.
29Here, we leave h ≥ 0 free, rather than setting h =0as we did in the main text (for convenience). By
leaving h free, we can see how it aﬀects the optimal design (ks,γs) of the stability pact.
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dk +[ ( p − 1)v
0





















where the second equality makes use of (21) and (6) and the fourth equality makes use of




B1 (1 − θyΓ0A2)+δA1 (B2 − θyΓ0)
1 − A2B2
.
We now need to work out the components B1 (1 − θyΓ0A2) and A1 (B2 − θyΓ0).W eh a v e :
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0 ((1 − p)v
0
2 − k)+( θyΓ
0 − δη)k]
dγ
dδ +[ ( p − 1)v
0
2 + k] db
dδ

















To evaluate this expression, we need to ﬁnd the expressions for db
dδ and
dγ
dδ.W e o b t a i n








































































We showed earlier that A2B2 < 1. Recall our assumption that θyΓ0 >η . Given that the
ﬁrst and second factor in square brackets in the second line of (24) are negative, (24) is
positive. Further, given our assumption that δ ≤ 1, (25) is positive. Hence, the marginal
welfare eﬀect of introducing some relief is positive.
FP r o o f t h a t Max[γl,γh]=γh
Note that when δ ↓ 0, (7) converges to (11) and γh coincides with γl.D i ﬀerentiating (6)











which completes the proof.
G Proof of Proposition 9








where a star superscript indicates that we evaluate expressions at (γ,b)=( γ∗,b ∗),w h e r e
b∗ is the value of b that solves (6) for γ = γ∗. All terms in the ensuing proof will be




















































2 − δηk + k
db
dγ












































because θyΓ0 − η>0 by assumption and where the expression for db





















because δ ≤ 1 and θyΓ0 >η .
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With pork-barrel programs now a decision variable, maximizing (5) implies an additional






H.1 Eﬀects of changes in k
Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions (6), (7) and (26) yields
dγ
dk
















































































which is equivalent to
dγ
dk
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January 2005˜ A1 ≡ A1/(1 − A3C2),
˜ A2 ≡ (A2 + A3C1)/(1 − A3C2),
˜ B1 ≡ B1/(1 − B3C1),
˜ B2 ≡ (B2 + B3C2)/(1 − B3C1).





































1 − ˜ A2 ˜ B2
´
. (34)

















































































We obtain an overall welfare evaluation by substituting into the ﬁnal line of this expression




dk (from (32) - (34)).
H.2 Eﬀects of changes in δ
Totally diﬀerentiating the system (6), (7) and (26) with respect to δ yields:
dγ
dδ




























= k ˜ A1 ˜ B2/
³





= k ˜ A1/
³
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The ﬁnal step in computing the eﬀect on social welfare is to substitute into the ﬁnal line




dδ (from (38) - (40)).
I Budgetary opaqueness
I.1 First-order conditions
I nt h ec a s ew h e r er e l i e fi snever granted (δ =0 ), the ﬁrst-order conditions for b, γ and h
are, respectively:
E{v
0 [θy − (h + ηγ)+b]} = k + pv



























I.2 Derivation of (15)
For the case of ¯ η − σ<¯ s − h/γ < ¯ η + σ,w ec a nw r i t e :
kE[w(b)] = k
½
E[b − δ (h + ηγ)|h/γ + η ≤ ¯ s] ∗ Pr[h/γ + η ≤ ¯ s]+
E[b|h/γ + η>¯ s] ∗ Pr[h/γ + η>¯ s]
¾
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(h/γ)(¯ s − h/γ)+1
2 (¯ s − h/γ)
2
¯ s + σ − (h/γ +¯ η)
−
(h/γ)(¯ η − σ)+1
2 (¯ η − σ)
2







[(¯ s + σ) − (h/γ +¯ η)][¯ s − h/γ +¯ η − σ]




















[(¯ s − σ)+( h/γ +¯ η)].
Further:
Pr(h/γ + η ≤ ¯ s)=P r( η ≤ ¯ s − h/γ)=




kE[w(b)] = kb− 1























2 +2 σ (h/γ +¯ η) − (h/γ +¯ η)
2¤
,
which is easily written as (15).
I.3 The eﬀect of (h/γ +¯ η) on expected relief
We have:
∂[¯ s2−σ2+2σ(h/γ+¯ η)−(h/γ+¯ η)2]
∂(h/γ+¯ η) =2 σ − 2(h/γ +¯ η) ≤ 0, (46)
because ¯ η ≥ σ and h ≥ 0. Moreover, we note that, when h/γ +¯ η =¯ s + σ,t h et e r m
£
¯ s2 − σ2 +2 σ(h/γ +¯ η) − (h/γ +¯ η)
2¤
reduces to zero. Because ¯ s>0, a marginal re-
duction of (h/γ +¯ η) from the level (¯ s + σ) implies that h/γ +¯ η>σ , so that the term
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¯ s2 − σ2 +2 σ(h/γ +¯ η) − (h/γ +¯ η)
2¤
becomes positive. Hence, (46) is positive and de-
creasing in (h/γ +¯ η) for all (h/γ +¯ η) that fulﬁll ¯ η − σ<¯ s − h/γ < ¯ η + σ,w h i c hi s
equivalent to ¯ s − σ<h / γ+¯ η<¯ s + σ.













which can be positive or negative for values of (h/γ +¯ η) that fulﬁll ¯ η−σ<¯ s−h/γ < ¯ η+σ.
If h/γ +¯ η =¯ s +σ,t h e nt h i sd e r i v a t i v ei sn e g a t i v e .I f¯ s>¯ η and h is not too large or γ is
not too small, then this derivative is positive.
I.5 Proof of Proposition 10























which is rewritten as:
db
dk = ˆ B1 + ˆ B2
dγ























Hence, the direct eﬀect of k on b,c a p t u r e db y ˆ B1, is negative. We similarly ﬁnd:
db
dδ = ˆ B2
dγ




d¯ s = ˆ B2
dγ




dσ = ˆ B2
dγ
dσ + ˆ B3
dh
dσ,
so that the direct eﬀects of δ, ¯ s and σ on b are zero.
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[2(h/γ +¯ η) − σ]+
£
¯ s





















dk = δ ˆ A1 + ˆ A2
db



























































This shows that the direct eﬀect of an increase in k on γ is positive.
In an analogous way, we ﬁnd:
dγ
dδ = k ˆ A1 + ˆ A2
db
dδ + ˆ A3
dh
dδ,
which shows that the direct eﬀect of δ on γ is positive.































d¯ s − 2h
γ2
dγ
















































































































































































d¯ s + ˆ A3
dh
d¯ s,
which shows that the direct eﬀect of ¯ s on γ is positive.

































































































































































i + ˆ A2
db








σ2 +¯ s2 +( h/γ)






 + ˆ A2
db
dσ + ˆ A3
dh
dσ,
so that the direct eﬀect of σ on γ is negative if ¯ s>¯ η.



























































































Hence, the direct eﬀect of k on h is negative.
Next, diﬀerentiating (18) with respect to δ, and following analogous steps yields:
dh
dδ







which shows that the direct eﬀect of δ on h is negative.










so that the direct eﬀect of ¯ s on h is zero.

























































so that the direct eﬀect of σ on h is positive.
I.6 Work out (41), (17) and (18)
We work out the ﬁrst-order conditions (41), (17) and (18) under the assumption of
quadratic utilities (19). Working out (41) yields:
E{−(ξ − 1)[θy − (h + ηγ)+b]+ξ} = k − p(ξ − 1)[θΓ(γ)y − b]+pξ ⇔
−(ξ − 1)[θy − (h +¯ ηγ)+b]+ξ = k + p(ξ − 1)[b − θΓ(γ)y]+pξ ⇔
b =
(1 − p)ξ − k
(1 + p)(ξ − 1)
+
θy[pΓ(γ) − 1] + (h +¯ ηγ)
1+p
. (47)
Working out (18) gives:
49
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 433
January 2005ω [−(ξ − 1)h + ξ]=1
2kδ[(h/γ +¯ η)/σ − 1] +
−(ξ − 1)[θy − (h +¯ ηγ)+b]+ξ.
Hence,

































0 + η − I]
£
−1
2 (ξ − 1)((1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y +( η − I)γ)+ξ
¤
−η [−(ξ − 1)(θy − (h + ηγ)+b)+ξ]+pθyΓ































0 +¯ η − I]
©
−1






2 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)Γ
0 + η − I]ηγ
ª
+¯ η (ξ − 1)(θy − h + b) − ¯ ηξ
−(ξ − 1) 1
6σ
£
(¯ η + σ)
3 − (¯ η − σ)
3¤
γ + pθyΓ































0 +¯ η − I]
©
ξ − 1
2 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y − Iγ]
ª
−1
2 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)yΓ
0 − I]¯ ηγ − 1
2 (ξ − 1) 1
6σ
£
(¯ η + σ)
3 − (¯ η − σ)
3¤
γ
+¯ η(ξ − 1)(θy − h + b) − ¯ ηξ − (ξ − 1) 1
6σ
£
(¯ η + σ)
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0 +¯ η − I]
©
ξ − 1
2 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y − Iγ]
ª
−1
2 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)yΓ
0 − I]¯ ηγ − 1
4σ (ξ − 1)
£
(¯ η + σ)
3 − (¯ η − σ)
3¤
γ
+¯ η (ξ − 1)(θy − h + b) − ¯ ηξ + pθyΓ






























We can substitute the solutions for b and h obtained above and then solve this expression
numerically for γ.
I.7 Work out (41), (42) and (43)
We work out the ﬁrst-order conditions (41), (42) and (43) under the assumption of
quadratic utilities (19). Working out (41) yields again (47). Working out (43) yields
in a straightforward manner:




(ξ−1)(ω+1) ,E 2 ≡ 1
ω+1.














Working out (42) in analogous way to what we did above:
[(1 − θ)yΓ
0 +¯ η − I]
©
ξ − 1
2 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y − Iγ]
ª
−1
2 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)yΓ
0 − I]¯ ηγ − 1
4σ (ξ − 1)
£
(¯ η + σ)
3 − (¯ η − σ)
3¤
γ
+¯ η (ξ − 1)(θy − h + b) − ¯ ηξ + pθyΓ
0 [ξ − (ξ − 1)(θΓ(γ)y − b)] = 0.
Again we can substitute the solutions for b and h as functions of γ into this equation and
solve it numerically for γ.
I.8 Work out (41), (44) and (45)
We work out the ﬁrst-order conditions (41), (44) and (45) under the assumption of
quadratic utilities (19).Working out (41) yields again (47). Working out (43) yields:
ω[−(ξ − 1)h + ξ]=−(kδ)/γ − (ξ − 1)[θy − (h +¯ ηγ)+b]+ξ.
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(ξ−1)(ω+1) ,F 2 ≡ 1
ω+1.














Working out (44) in analogous way to what we did above:
[(1 − θ)yΓ
0 +¯ η − I]
©
ξ − 1
2 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y − Iγ]
ª
−1
2 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)yΓ
0 − I]¯ ηγ − 1
4σ (ξ − 1)
£
(¯ η + σ)
3 − (¯ η − σ)
3¤
γ
+¯ η(ξ − 1)(θy − h + b) − ¯ ηξ + pθyΓ
0 [ξ − (ξ − 1)(θΓ(γ)y − b)] = −kδ¯ η.
Again we can substitute the solutions for b and h as functions of γ into this equation and
solve it numerically for γ.
I.9 Computation social welfare
Social welfare is given by
2E[u(c1)] + E[v(f1)] + E[v(f2)].







8 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y +( η − I)γ]
2
+1








3 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y +( η − I)γ]








ξ [(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y +( ¯ η + σ − I)γ]
2 − ξ [(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y +( ¯ η − σ − I)γ]
2
+1
3 (ξ − 1)[(1 − θ)(1+Γ(γ))y +(¯ η − σ − I)γ]
3
−1















2 (ξ − 1)[θy − (h + ηγ)+b]








6 (ξ − 1) 1
γ [θy − (h + ηγ)+b]
3 − 1
2ξ 1








3 (ξ − 1)[θy − (h + ηγ)+b]






3 (ξ − 1)[θy − (h +(¯ η + σ)γ)+b]
3 − 1
3 (ξ − 1)[θy − (h +(¯ η − σ)γ)+b]
3
+ξ [θy − (h +(¯ η − σ)γ)+b]





2 (ξ − 1)[θΓ(γ)y − b]
2 + ξ [θΓ(γ)y − b].
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